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INTRODUCTION: THE ANALYTIC ENGAGEMENT WITH CONTINENTAL 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
This Special Issue of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies originates from ‘A 
Dangerous Liaison? The Analytic Engagement with Continental Philosophy’, a conference 
held at the University of York on 9th December 2011 courtesy of the support of The Mind 
Association, the Aristotelian Society, and the Humanities Research Centre.  There were four 
invited speakers, each with a respondent, and two graduate speakers, with papers presented 
by four of the six article authors in this volume.  The aim of the conference was to promote 
cross-pollination between the two traditions of philosophy, with the emphasis on what 
analytic philosophers could gain from engaging with phenomenology and hermeneutics.  The 
conference was bookended by two excellent broadcasts on the relationship under scrutiny: 
Stephen Mulhall, Béatrice Han-Pile, and Hans-Johann Glock were interviewed on BBC 
Radio 4 in a programme of In Our Time entitled ‘The Continental-Analytic Split’ on 10th 
November; and the Philosophy Bites podcast for 18th December was ‘Brian Leiter on The 
Analytic/Continental Distinction’. 
 
As all four of the interviewees point out, the terms ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘Continental’ are 
misnomers and the ‘divide’ itself an over-simplification, ‘the culture of two cultures’ in 
Simon Glendenning’s terms.1  There are nonetheless different styles of doing philosophy, and 
the distinction between approaches derived from Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl on the one 
hand and Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the other provides – at the very least – a 
starting point for inquiries into the recent history of philosophy.  Furthermore, regardless of 
the grounds of the distinction, it remains the cause of not only resistance but open hostility.  
The inspiration behind the conference is illustrated by the dialogue between Socrates and 
Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic, particularly the following:     
But, in any case, after we’d agreed that justice is virtue and that injustice is vice and 
ignorance, I said: All right, let’s take that as established.  But we also said that 
injustice is powerful, or don’t you remember that, Thrasymachus?  I remember, but 
I’m not satisfied with what you’re now saying.  I could make a speech about it, but if I 
did, I know that you’d accuse me of engaging in oratory.  So either allow me to speak, 
or, if you want to ask questions, go ahead, and I’ll say “All right,” and nod yes and 
no, as one does to old wives’ tales.2 
What is so depressing about this exchange is the refusal by each to engage with the other’s 
philosophy on the basis of its style alone.  There has been no philosophical impasse; the 
problem is that Thrasymachus sees no value in elenchus and that Socrates rejects rhetoric.  As 
a result, Thrasymachus refuses to take Socrates’ questions seriously, and there is no 
meaningful discussion between the two.  Regrettably, this refusal to engage – a refusal to 
regard the opposing approach to philosophy as worthy of critique or criticisms as worthy of 
responses – remains all too common.      
 
The most well-known exchanges of the twentieth century were characterised by ad hominen 
accusations and political objections rather than philosophical argument.  Several Continental 
philosophers made easy targets for their Analytic opponents: Nietzsche’s philosophy was 
appropriated by the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, Heidegger failed to explain or 
apologise for his membership of that party from 1933 to 1945, and Heidegger, Kierkegaard, 
and Bergson were popular with Afrikaner intellectuals during the apartheid era.  Within this 
dialogue, the clash between Anglo-American philosophy and critical theory has been 
especially vehement, and the controversies surrounding Paul de Man’s wartime journalism 
(1987) and Alan Sokal’s publishing hoax (1996) served only to fuel further discord.  A 
promising and ultimately lengthy dialogue between Jacques Derrida and John Searle from 
1972 to 1994 resulted in an unproductive methodological critique which failed to illuminate 
issues in the philosophy of language.  As the century drew to a close, Derrida became the 
focus of Analytic assaults, and was accused of being an ‘intellectual charlatan’ when he was 
nominated for an honorary degree at Cambridge in 1992.3  Controversy dogged Derrida post-
mortem, as the title of Derek Attridge and Thomas Baldwin’s obituary suggests: ‘Jacques 
Derrida: deep thinker or truth-thief?’4  Jonathan Kandell’s ‘Jacques Derrida, Abstruse 
Theorist, Dies at 74’ was not as sympathetic.5   
 
The opposition to Derrida’s legacy of deconstructive criticism shows no signs of abating.  
Richard Gaskin, for example, reserves two thirds of his rigorous and comprehensive 
monograph on the cognitive value of literature, Language, Truth, and Literature: A Defence 
of Literary Humanism (2013), for a critique of critical theory, the lion’s share of which is 
directed at Derrida.  One might wonder why Gaskin devotes so much space and energy to 
deconstruction when ‘the death of deconstruction’ was commented on at least as early as 
1994,6 but if deconstruction had lost some of its initial glamour by the mid-nineties, the 
‘ethical turn’ was very much in its heyday – and is still apparently fighting fit.  Last year 
alone there were dozens of publications applying Derrida’s writings to subjects as diverse as 
the relationship between humans and animals, language and meaning in law, leadership in 
education, and the relationship between humans and technology.  Of these, Kelly Oliver’s 
Technologies of Life and Death: From Cloning to Capital Punishment (2013) offers an 
example of what Analytic philosophers stand to lose by failing to engage with deconstructive 
criticism in particular, and the Continental tradition in general.   
 Oliver is determined to avoid charges of deliberate obscurantism and ineffability, to take 
Anglo-American philosophy on at its own game, and her first paragraph ends with a sentence 
beginning “In this book, I” – the paradigm of the purposefully unimaginative opening 
characteristic of the tradition focused firmly on analysis.7  She makes two such statements of 
intent in rapid succession: to examine the relationship between technology and ethics with 
particular attention to the processes of life and death, and to employ Derrida’s The Beast and 
the Sovereign to reconceptualise debates concerning life and death.8  There are several 
analyses of great insight, at least one of which is sufficient to dispel the claims that 
deconstructive criticism has nothing to offer philosophy.  Oliver interprets Levinas’ emphasis 
on responsibility and the priority of the other over the self (hyperbolic ethics) in terms of 
Kant’s maxim of ought implies can.  For Kant, one has no duty to save a drowning child if 
one is not capable of saving the child, for example if one cannot swim.  Oliver asks: ‘What if 
ought implies cannot?  What if our obligations always outstrip our intentions?’9  The idea is 
that there are an infinite number of obligations an individual ought to meet and that not only 
does the individual’s finite life prevent her from meeting these obligations, but that meeting 
one obligation (such as donating money to a charity) often precludes meeting another 
(donating that money to a different, but equally worthy, charity).  Oliver conceives of Derrida 
as negotiating a path between Kant and Levinas, but unfortunately her own thesis is not fully 
developed in the work.10   
 
Both Gaskin and Oliver have much to offer philosophy and yet neither recognises value in 
the approach employed by the other, in much the same way as Socrates and Thrasymachus 
above.  Gaskin is an analytic philosopher with a great love for, and knowledge of, literature.  
Oliver is a deconstructive critic with an astute grasp of philosophy and its practical 
application.  They both make cogent arguments and present fascinating insights.  Although he 
would disagree, Gaskin’s linguistic idealism, his claim that ‘the structure of reality has its 
origin in the meanings of words’ comes perilously close to Derrida’s anti-realism.11  Oliver at 
times employs a seamless blend of analysis and interpretation.  There is an overlap between 
the two which neither will admit, a failure which gives the appearance of an insurmountable 
barrier to dialogue.  Their approaches should not, however, be considered mutually exclusive 
and all six articles in this volume look beyond the antagonism between philosophy and 
theory, between the Analytic and Continental traditions, to a mutually beneficial – if 
adversarial – exchange.   
 
The papers and responses reflect a variety of perspectives on this exchange.  Ray Monk 
discusses the relationship between Wittgenstein and Husserl, arguing against the alleged 
affinities between Wittgenstein and the phenomenological tradition.  This is followed by 
Christopher Norris, from the other side of the divide, who argues that while Russell was the 
last great philosopher in the Analytic tradition, both Derrida and Badiou are worthy of 
comparison to philosophers such as Plato, Leibniz, and Hegel.  Simon Skempton contrasts 
two responses to the problem of Hegel’s conception of infinity, one from Badiou and the 
other from Graham Priest, discussing the work of Georg Cantor and Russell in his defence of 
Hegel.  The remaining three papers are by philosophers working in the Anglo-American 
tradition who bridge the divide in their engagement with Continental philosophy.  Joel Smith 
draws on both Kant and Merleau-Ponty in evaluating the case for Act-Space.  Donnchadh O 
Conaill explores the common ground among Merleau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus, and John 
McDowell in his examination of the space of reasons.  Joshua Tepley presents an analytic 
interpretation of ‘being’ in an attempt to illuminate one of Heidegger’s most opaque 
concepts.  All three demonstrate precisely why dialogue is productive and why Analytic 
philosophers cannot afford to ignore the Continental tradition. 
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